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I. Introduction
The year 1996 was marked by the lawyers, representing competing industry interests, getting
together under the aegis of the Maritime Law Association and putting forth a proposed revision
of COGSA, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The draft proposal is currently before Congress
and is expected to be taken up sometime during 1997. A brief synopsis of the proposed
amendments to COGSA is indicated here. Ultimately the changes are designed to bring American
law more in line with those of our major trading partners. Also, during the past year, one
Supreme Court case caused ripples in the legal community and several other significant Circuit
Court decisions are presented.
II. Proposed Amendments to COGSA
The United States enacted the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in 1936.' The statute embodied
a 1924 international convention known as the Hague Rules.2 This convention, in turn, was
modeled on a 1910 Canadian statute called the Water Carriage of Goods Act.' The Canadian
law was itself modeled on the Harter Act passed by Congress in 1893.4 The Hague Rules
were modified in 1968 by the Visby Protocol such that the Hague-Visby Rules are now in
force in most of Western Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and Canada.'
In 1978 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law completed revisions
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1. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1300-1315 (1988)).
2. Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25,
1924, 51 Star. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S.
3. Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910, 9-10 Edw. 7, ch. 61.
4. Harter Act, Ch. 105, 27 Star. 445 (1893) (codified) at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196 (1988).
S. Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
to Bills of Lading, Dec. 21, 1979, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 28 (Cmnd. 9197).
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to the Hague Rules. These revisions, known as the Hamburg Rules,6 were ratified by twenty-two
countries. Most of these countries are in the third world.7
Though it is generally agreed that COGSA is in need of overhaul, the conflict between the
Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules presents a need for compromise. Congress is
considering it a proposed bill which attempts to strike a balance. An outline of the proposed
changes follows.
A. TACKLE-TO-TAcKLE LIMrrATION
The Hague Rules originally did not apply to periods before loading or after discharge! As
a result, goods were subject to two liability regimes in a single shipment. In the U.S., bills of
lading frequently called for application of COGSA throughout the shipment, though this solution
has not always proved effective. The proposed bill repeals Section 12 of the 1936 COGSA,
which preserved the application of the Harter Act outside the tackle-to-tackle interval.'
B. VOLUNTARY ExTENSIONS OF COGSA
Because of modifications in the existing tackle-to-tackle provisions, Section 7 of COGSA
which permits an extension of COGSA is no longer necessary and would be repealed under
the bill.' °
C. BILLS OF LADING
With the advent of electronic data exchange and other paperless transactions, there is some
question as to whether COGSA in its current form would include such materials as a bill of
lading or document of title. The bill would substitute "contracts of carriage" for "bills of
lading" in most instances and would recognize an electronic bill of lading as a contract of
carriage. "
D. DECK CARRIAGE
The original Hague Rules contemplated that deck carriage of goods was particularly risky
and it would be unfair to hold ocean carriers to the statutory standards in such circumstances.'
Modern vessel design, however, accommodates on-deck carriage in many instances. The bill
would amend COGSA to include on-deck carriage and thus better define the rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties."
E. DoMEsTIC TRADE
The proposed amendments would apply to all domestic shipments involving carriage by sea
for some or all of the journey. The proposed Act is intended to apply only when blue water
voyages are involved as part of the contractual transportation.' 4
6. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 608.
7. The following countries have ratified the Hamburg Rules: Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Chile, Egypt, Guinea, Hungary, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
8. MARfrIME L. Ass'N OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc LIABILITY RULES STUDY GROUP
AS REVISED BY THE AD Hoc REvIEW COMMITTEE 1I (1996) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
9. Id. at 12.
10. Id. at 14.
It. Id.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id.
14. Id.
VOL. 31, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES 237
F. NAVIGATIONAL FAULT EXCEPTION
The proposed amendments eliminate the navigational fault exception under which, in the
present statute, carriers may avoid liability by proving negligence on the part of their employees. "
The amendment would provide further for an allocation of responsibility where loss or damage
is attributable partially to carrier fault and partially to excepted perils listed in the Act. The
result would be statutory recognition of the contemporary doctrine of comparative fault. 6
G. THE FIRE EXCEPTION
The proposed bill retains the fire exception but requires that the ocean carrier claim the
exception only on a vessel it has furnished and only if the fire was not caused by its actual
fault or privity. The exception may also be daimed by a contracting carrier unless the fire was
caused by its actual fault or privity.
H. PER PACKAGE LIMITATION
The per package limit of liability would be revised under the proposed legislation to provide
a weight-based limitation scheme when the package weighs more than 735 pounds but provides
for use of the traditional package limitation when it weighs less than 73 5 pounds. 7 Further,
the proposed amendments make the limitation stronger than in its present form by providing
that an ocean carrier will not lose the benefit of unit limitation merely because some action
falls within the definition of "deviation" but an unreasonable deviation of such seriousness
that the carrier knew or should have known in loss or damage will strip the carrier of limitation
rights.'8 By like token, intentional misconduct will strip the carrier of the benefit of limitation. 9
I. Deviation
Under this change the carrier can still claim the per package limitation in the event of deviation
in the voyage unless the deviation was so reckless as to amount to misconduct of the sort
described above."' The effect is to eliminate the per se rule against even minor departures from
the contractual voyage.
J. "HIMALAYA" CLAUSES
Because the proposed bill generously expands the definition of "carrier" and thus extends
the statutory limitations and defenses to virtually any person or entity performing any of the
carrier's functions under a contract of carriage, the Himalaya Clause in bills of lading will
become unnecessary under an amended COGSA.
K. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND COVERAGE
The proposed bill specifies that the amended Act shall provide an independent basis for
admiralty jurisdiction even in instances arguably outside the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18.
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It would have no impact on "saving to suitors" lawsuits brought in state court but it would
specify that COGSA preempts application of any other substantive law or theory of recovery.
L. QUALIFYING STATEMENTS
The proposed legislation amends § 3(3) of the 1936 Act to clarify that the shipper has the
option to demand a negotiable bill of lading or other contract of carriage but, once issued, it
must contain the information required by subsection 3(3) which information may be qualified."
A further provision makes invalid any statement disclaiming responsibility for the accuracy of
the information. 3
M. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
Cargo interests gain greater protection than the current law provides under the proposed
amendments in reference to forum selection clauses. The proposed bill provides that if the
goods are loaded or discharged in a U.S. port, or if the carrier receives or delivers the goods
in the United States, or if it was the intent of any of the parties that any of these events take
place in the United States, then a foreign forum selection clause or a foreign arbitration clause
would be invalid under the amended Act.24 The proposed bill provides that the parties are free
to agree on foreign litigation or arbitration after a claim has arisen."
N. THE POMERENE ACT
Some of the proposed changes require modification of the Pomerene Act, chiefly relative
to bills of lading and the expanded scope of coverage under an amended COGSA. The changes
are intended to bring the statutes into harmony and to provide that to the extent there is any
inconsistency COGSA will govern where the statute applies. In cases outside the scope of
COGSA, the Pomerene Act is unaffected by the proposed bill.
0. SERVICE CONTRACTS
The existing statute provides that shippers are protected by the rule that the bill of lading
can increase a carrier's liability but may not decrease it below levels established in the Rules
and under COGSA. The proposed legislation would permit the immediate parties to a service
contract to reduce the liability below COGSA levels. Such an agreement would bind only the
parties thereto.
III. Significant Case Law Developments
A. VIMAR SEGUROS Y REASEGUROS, S.A. v. M/V SKY REEFER
One of the longstanding issues in ocean carriage of goods has been whether foreign forum
selection and foreign arbitration clauses in ocean bills of lading violate the carriage of goods
by Sea Act (COGSA). In Vimar Seguros YReaseguros, S.A. v. M/VSky Reefer, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the validity of these clauses.26
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id.
26. 11 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
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In that case, a U.S. shipper time chartered the Panamanian-owned M/V Sky Reefer, a refriger-
ated cargo ship, from a Japanese carrier to transport a cargo of oranges and lemons from
Morocco to Massachusetts. Thousands of boxes of oranges shifted during the voyage, resulting
in over SI million of damage. The shipper sued in a U.S. court and the Japanese carrier moved
to compel arbitration in Tokyo pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Bill
of Ladings Arbitration Clause which provided that "Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading
shall be referred to arbitration in Tokyo."'" The shipper relied on § 3(8) of COGSA, which
invalidates any provision in a bill of lading that "lessens" the carrier's liability. The shipper
argued that arbitration in Tokyo would cause considerable added expense and, as a practical
matter, would lessen the liability of the carrier. The shipper also argued that a conflict between
COGSA and the FAA should be resolved in favor of COGSA.
After examining the determinative provision in COGSA, the U.S. Supreme Court found
no conflict between the FAA and COGSA because foreign arbitration clauses do not violate
COGSA.2'8 According to the Court, the prohibition in § 3(8) refers only to liabilities "arising
from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties or obligations provided in this section.""9 (Emphasis
added.) It does not include the cost of proceedings to enforce all obligations arising from
COGSA. Further, the Court stated that this rationale applied not only to foreign arbitration
clauses but also to foreign forum selection clauses, in general.3"
In so holding, the Court rejected the rationale of the Indussa court where the Second Circuit
held that a forum selection clause in an ocean bill of lading governed by COGSA was invalid
because it tended to lessen the carrier's liability." The Indussa court determined that such a
clause put a "high hurdle" on the plaintiffs ability to enforce liability because it forced suit
to be brought in an inconvenient forum. 2
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that its new ruling rejecting Indussa was consistent with
the goals of the Hague rules, on which COGSA is based, and with contemporary principals
of international comity and commercial practice. The Court stated:
If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have a role as
a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before interpreting
its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international agreements. That concern counsels
against construing COGSA to nullify foreign arbitration clauses because of inconvenience to the
plaintiff or insular distrust of the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply the law."
The shipper in M/V Sky Reefer also argued that the arbitration clause should not be enforced
because the bill called for application ofJapanese law. 4 TheJapanese arbitrators would, therefore,
follow the Japanese Hague rules, which provide carriers with a defense based on the acts or
omissions of the stevedores hired by the shipper-a defense arguably not available under COGSA
that might thereby lessen the liability of the carrier." While the Court found more substance
in this argument, it nevertheless held that the issue was premature because it could not predict
27. Id. at 2424.
28. Id, at 2326.
29. Id,
30. Id.
31. Indussa Corporation v. SS Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. Id. at 203.
33. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
34. Id. at 2329.
35. Id.
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what the Japanese arbitrators would do. The district court retained jurisdiction over the case
and would have the opportunity to review the choice-of-law decision made by the arbitrators
when one of the parties moved the court to enforce any arbitration award. If there were no
opportunity to review the choice-of-law decision, leading to a loss of the shipper's right to
pursue its statutory remedies, the court indicated it "would have little hesitation in condemning
the agreement as against public policy."36 However, because the district court could consider
the award at the enforcement stage and determine whether the arbitration clause and choice-of-
law clause had operated in such a way as to be repugnant to United States public policy, it
upheld the validity of the clause.
B. BANANA SERVICES, INC. v. M/V TASMAN STAR
In the Banana Services case, the charterer of a vessel entered into a contract with a shipper
to transport bananas from Ecuador and Colombia to Florida." During the voyage from Colombia
to Florida, a fire broke out in the engine room, thereby damaging the refrigeration control
panels. The vessel returned to Colombia where it was determined that timely repairs to the
refrigeration system could not be made. The shipowner and charterer decided to proceed to
Florida with the cargo, despite the refrigeration failure. When the vessel arrived in Florida, the
attending surveyors determined that the fruit was not marketable because the pulp temperature
exceeded industry standards.
The shipper fded suit against the charterer and shipowner seeking more than $1.1 million
in damages. The shipowner and charterer invoked the COGSA fire exception, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1304(2)(b), and the fire statute, 46 U.S.C. § 182. After a bench trial, the district court
entered judgment against the shipper. The shipper appealed, asserting that the owner and
charterer could not assert these defenses without first demonstrating that they had acted with
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and addressed three aspects of
COGSA's fire exception and the fire statute. First, the court noted that, although the "actual
fault or privity" language of COGSA's fire exception differs from the "design or neglect"
language of the fire statute, "the phrases are functionally equivalent."38 Second, the court
confirmed that a fire need not directly ignite the cargo to be the cause of the cargo damage
under COGSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the cargo was
destroyed by fire because fire damaged the vessel's refrigeration control panels, preventing
refrigeration of the bananas.39 Third, the court specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's applicable
test and joined the Second and Fifth Circuits in holding that COGSA does not require a carrier
to demonstrate due diligence as a condition precedent to invoking the COGSA fire exception
or the fire statute.'
C. WORLD TANKER CARRIERS CORPORATION V. M/V YA MIAWLAYA
In World Tanker Carriers two vessels, the M/V Ya Mawlaya and the M/V New World,
collided in international waters off the coast of Portugal.4 The M/V New World was an
36. Id. at 2330.
37. 68 F.3d 418 (11th Cir. 1995).
38. Id. at 420.
39. Id. at 420-21.
40. Id. at 421.
41. 99 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996).
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oceangoing tanker registered under the laws of Hong Kong and owned by World Tanker
Carrier Corporation of Liberia. The M/V Ya Mawlaya was an oceangoing bulk carrier registered
under the laws of Cyprus, and was proceeding to Italy with a cargo of soybeans owned by
Cereol Italia SRL and loaded in Destrehan, Louisiana, within the Port of New Orleans. The
ownership of the M/V Ya Mawlaya was in dispute, but all parties allegedly having an interest
in the M/V Ya Mawlaya were named as defendants.
The collision caused an explosion and fire, resulting in numerous personal injuries and
property damage. One of the alleged owners of the M/V Ya Mawlaya filed a limitation action,
and all the suits were consolidated in the limitation.
Defendants then moved to dismiss all the proceedings against them, asserting as a defense
lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the Motion to Dismiss holding that
neither Louisiana's Long Arm Statute nor Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(k)(2) provided
a basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The court first found that World Tanker
failed to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction demonstrating the defendants' minimum
contacts with Louisiana were sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of the State
Long Arm Statute. The court then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the theory
that it could not order the requested additional jurisdictional discovery under Rule 4(k)(2)
because the consolidated cases did not present a claim "arising under federal law," the jurisdic-
tional predicate of Rule 4(k)(2). The court interpreted this phrase as a reference to "federal
question cases" and, therefore, found the rule inapposite insofar as World Tanker had not
raised a federal question daim against the defendants. The court of appeal reversed. 2
Initially, the appellate court noted that whether admiralty actions arise under federal law
was an issue of first impression for the court. Accordingly, before a determination could be
made as to whether admiralty daims fall under Rule 4(k)(2), the court had to consider the
meaning of arising under federal law.
The court went on to discuss the Advisory Committee notes following Rule 4(kX2), and
indicated that the use of the word "any" to qualify "federal law" strongly suggested that the
Advisory Committee intended Rule 4(kX2) to reach not just federal question cases under
§ 1331 but all claims arising under substantive federal law.4" Further, according to the court,
the Rule's legislative history supported a broad interpretation in that, prior to enactment of
the Rule, there was a gap in the court's jurisdiction:
[W]hile a defendant may have sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to satisfy due
process concerns, if she had insufficient contacts with any single state, she would not be amenable
to service by a federal court sitting in that state."4
According to the court, Rule 4(k)2 was adopted in response to this problem, and the court
found no suggestion in the notes discussing Rule 4(kX2) that the Rule was meant as a companion
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For these reasons, the court held that, for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2),
"arising under federal law" refers not only to federal question cases as understood in § 1331,
but to all substantive federal law claims.
With respect to the applicability of Rule 4(k)(2) to admiralty cases, the court made reference
to the case of Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co." which the district court relied
42. Id. at 720.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 721.
45. 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468, 3 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1959).
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upon in sustaining the defendants' exceptions.46 While the court recognized that the Romero
principal has had procedural importance in the context of removal jurisdiction and the right
to jury trial, the court pointed out thatJustice Frankfurter's opinion in Romero referred repeatedly
to "federal maritime law," and uncritically accepted the idea that the general maritime law
constitutes federal law.
47
Further, the court relied on Artide 3 § 2, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution which extends
the judicial power of the federal sovereign to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. ,48
The court also cited 28 U.S.C. § 1333 which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of:
1. Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all of the
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
49
According to the court, the first clause of § 13 3 3 allocates to federal courts the power
to hear any matter which is in admiralty, regardless of the existence of a federal statute
creating the maritime right, diversity of citizenship, or the minimum amount in controversy.
The second clause grants state courts subject matter jurisdiction, concurrent with federal
courts, over most maritime matters. The court found it significant that the second clause
does not "grant states the right to apply their own substantive law to maritime matters
pending in their courts ..."50 See Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty 10 (3d Ed. 1996). Thus,
application of the substantive law of the state with the most significant relationship to the
controversy is appropriate only when the "maritime but local" doctrine applies; that is,
when the matter is maritime in nature but there is neither an applicable federal statute
governing the claim nor a perceived need for uniformity of maritime law.
Thus, according to the court, "[t]he substantive maritime law of the United States is federal
law, except in the limited circumstances where the "maritime but local" doctrine applies."'"
Moreover, the court observed that, since the enactment of Rule 4(k)(2), several district courts
have recognized its applicability to admiralty cases. For all of these reasons, the court concluded
that federal law includes admiralty cases for the purposes of Rule 4(k)(2)."
The court then moved on to a consideration of whether the Rule provided a basis for personal
jurisdiction over the defendants under the familiar minimum contacts analysis used to determine
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' The court noted that "the burden of persuasion lies with plaintiff
to make a prima facie showing of the defendants nationwide minimum contacts" and, "based
on the record before it, (the court concluded) that World Tanker had not carried its burden."54
However, the court was persuaded by World Tanker's argument that the district court foreclosed
World Tanker's ability to make its prima facie showing when it dismissed the jurisdictional
claim.




50. Id. (quoting Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty 10, 3d ed. 1996).
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According to the Court of Appeal, the district "court's finding was premised on an [erroneous]
conclusion that Rule 4(k)(2) did not apply to admiralty cases, and, thus, an analysis of the
defendants' nationwide contacts would be irrelevant."" Accordingly, the court of appeal "re-
versed and remanded the case to the district court for additional jurisdictional discovery as to
the [defendants'] nationwide contacts and further proceedings consistent with the opinion."' 6
D. SILVER STAR ENTERPRISES, INC. V. MN SARAMACCA"
In this matter Transocean, Ltd., a lessor of cargo containers, provided 122 cargo containers
to Scheepvaart Maatschappij Suriname N.V. (SMS), a corporate entity which operated a
shipping container service and chartered eight vessels induding the M/V Saramacca. When
SMS failed to pay Transocean lease payments for the container rental, Transocean seized the
vessel daiming maritime lien rights against the containers aboard the M/V Saramacca. Transocean
moved for summary judgment demonstrating that 64 of the 122 containers leased were used
at least once aboard the M/V Saramacca and ten had been used exdusively aboard the seized
vessel. The district court granted partial summary judgment in the favor of Transocean acknowl-
edging a maritime lien for past due rentals, repair costs, and depreciated replacement value for
the ten containers used exclusively aboard the M/V Saramacca. In reaching the condusion,
the court held that for purposes of establishing a maritime lien, it was not necessary that the
containers be earmarked for use aboard a particular vessel. Silver Star appealed the judgment
and the matter went before the Fifth Circuit.
By way of background, it is imperative to know that the second, fourth, and ninth circuits
had held for slightly different reasons that bulk lessors of containers do not have maritime lien
rights against vessels operated by owners or charterers of multiple vessels. Whereas the courts
recognized that provision of a container to a vessel would constitute a maritime lien, when
bulk lessors provide numbers of containers in bulk, the courts did not feel that they were
provided for the benefit of individual vessels.
Whereas the Fifth Circuit in Equikase v. M/V Sampson gave the "furnishing" requirement
of the maritime lien act a very broad application, the Court deined to extend the broad
interpretation in the present.' 8 They went on to indicate that the reasoning of their sister
circuits was dispositive on the issue. They felt that Silver Star furnished containers to SMS,
not the SMS vessels, and it was SMS that ultimately dictated what containers were placed on
what vessels. Neither party knew aboard which ship in particular a container would be placed
at any given time and basically do to the fluidity of intermodal transport, it could not be said
that the containers were earmarked to a particular vessel nor that necessaries were provided
to a vessel as required by the FMLA. It is also important to note that the Court felt that a
decision by it creating a circuit split in permitting the affixation of maritime liens for bulk
container lessors in one part of the country would spawn uncertainty compounded by form
shopping and extravagant lien claims. They conduded their opinion by indicating "that
Transocean arguments are compelling, they should find a sympathetic hearing in Congress."
55. Id. at 724.
56. Id.
57. 82 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1996).
58. 93 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 05984 (1986).
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